With a brief description of the physical setting and institutional history of the Australian water sector, this paper reviews the water institutional reforms in Australia focusing especially on the nature and extent of reforms initiated since 1995 and provides a few case studies to highlight the issues and challenges in effecting changes in some key reform components. The reforms initiated in 1995 are notable for their comprehensiveness, fiscal incentives and clear and time-bound targets to be achieved. Although water institutions in Australia have undergone remarkable changes, thanks to the reforms, there are still issues and challenges inherent in reforming maturing water institutions. Regional diversity in legal systems and quality standards as well as conflicts between private interest and public welfare are still serious to constraining market-based water allocation and management. While Australia still needs further reforms, its recent reform experience provides considerable insights into the understanding of both the theory and the practice of water institutional reforms.
Introduction
Australia, a thinly populated dry island of continental proportions, covers an area of 7.7 million square kilometres with a population of only about 19 million. Despite its vast territory and small population, water is still a critical issue in Australia because the country is marked by recurrent droughts and extreme floods leading river flow and groundwater recharge to be extremely low and variable. The acute variability of water potential has not been fully appreciated until recently. The problems generated by past development approaches guiding the water sector, especially the "magic pudding approach watering of the land", "rain follows the plough", and "yeoman farmer" and the emerging pressures from urban growth and environmental requirements are now major issues in the Australian water sector. As a result, water institutional reforms are being implemented in each of the Australian states in an effort achieve a new balance in inter-sectoral water allocation, consistent with the changing economic, environmental and social needs for water. New solutions to the water overexploitation and over-allocation problems need also to be found, including the focus on local-level options such as water reuse as well as national-level solutions, such as those based on sound water reallocation and management (Australian Financial Review, 2003) .
Against a brief description of the physical setting and institutional history of the Australian water sector, this paper reviews the water institutional reforms initiated since 1995 and identifies the issues and challenges of reform implementation based on case studies of a few key reform components. The paper also highlights some aspects of the institutional history that explain the present status as well as the future path of the Australian water sector and its institutions. The paper also tries to evaluate the Australian reform experience in light of the framework and results reported in the recent study on water institutional reforms by Saleth & Dinar (2004) . With regard to its organisation, the second and third sections describe the physical and institutional setting, respectively, of the Australian water sector. While the fourth section reviews the nature and extent of recent reform, the fifth section provides a few case studies to highlight implementation issues and challenges. The next section reflects the Australian reform experience from the perspectives of the theory and practice of water institutional reforms. The final section completes the paper with some main conclusions.
Physical features of the water sector
The information from the water audit completed in 2000 can be used to provide a brief but clear description of the water resources and its regional and sectoral patterns of allocation. The 2000 audit is comprehensive, as it has built on the data available from the previous audits in 1962, 1975 and 1985 . As per the 2000 audit, in 1996-97, Australia had used 23,300 gigaliters (GL) or 1 million cubic meters of water. Of this total water used, 19,100 GL came from surface water and the balance from groundwater. But, in 1984, the total water use was only 14,600 GL. Based on its past growth rate, water use is projected to reach the unsustainable level of 32,550 GL by 2020. At the national level, therefore, the average water use has increased by 65% since the early 1980s, but the largest increase occurred in Queensland and New South Wales (NSW). Large dam storage in 1901 amounted only to 249 GL but, by 1950, it had increased to 9,509 GL and by 1990 to 78,919 GL (Broughton, 1999) .
1 A third of this storage is in NSW and another third is in Tasmania (essentially for hydropower generation). Most of the addition to storage occurred during 1960-79 as it was during this period that dams with a total capacity of 50,000 GL were constructed (Broughton, 1999) .
Regional variations in water availability are very acute in Australia. For instance, of the 12 drainage divisions of the country, only five divisions covering just 26% of the national territory 1 In the Australian context, water storage is higher than annual water use in view of the need to assure water security over the drought and dry years that occur more frequently than normal for many other countries of Asia and Africa. Thus, for instance, in the Murray-Darling basin, water storage is about 2.8 times its annual flow so as to ensure a high degree of drought-proofing for the basin. account for 88% of the total exploitable water resources. The same is also true of water use, especially for agriculture. Irrigation accounts for about 75% of the total water use and supports about 1.7 million hectares of croplands, pastures and orchards. Almost four-fifths of this irrigated area is concentrated in the Murray-Darling basin -the major interstate river basin covering parts of NSW, Victoria and Southern Australia (see Saleth & Dinar, 1999) . Although irrigation dominates in the inter-sectoral allocation of water, urban, environmental and recreational water needs have been increasing over years exerting serious pressures on the current allocations to the irrigation sector. Table 1 shows the regional and sectoral patterns of water use.
From a national perspective, the current level of water use forms only less than 20% of the surface and 10% of the subsurface water resources potential. But these figures are deceptive as most parts of the available supply, especially in the interior areas, are unusable owing to high salinity and spatial mismatch between supply and demand. Thus, Australia remains susceptible to water overexploitation and water scarcity problems as can be seen from the information in the 2000 audit. In the 2000 audit, surface water resources of the country are divided into 12 drainage divisions, 246 river basins and 325 surface water management areas. Similarly, groundwater resources are divided into 69 groundwater provinces and 538 groundwater management units. The levels of surface and groundwater development across these management units, as assessed by the 2000 audit are shown in Table 2 . As can be seen from Table 2 , about one-quarter of the surface water management areas and over one-third of the groundwater management areas were assessed to be at a high level of development and approaching or beyond sustainable extraction limits. This assessment of the regional pattern of water development is based on a broader definition of "sustainable flow/yield". The definition adopted by the audit is based not just on physical aspects but also on economic, social and environmental considerations including water quality and salinity. Since the levels of surface flow and aquifer yield taken as sustainable are higher in the audit than those underlying the water allocation made before 1990, there has been a real water over-allocation causing a severe stress on the water resources of the country.
The historical and institutional contexts
The underlying paradigm governing water resources development in Australia during can be characterised by the model of "magic pudding" 2 . In this model, growth in water demand over time is met by additional water supply through increased capture and development of water resources. The limitations of this approach as well as the increasing irrelevance of earlier beliefs such as "rains follows the plough" and "yeoman farmer" did become apparent, at least since 1900. For instance, as early as 1901, problems, such as soil erosion through overstocking, destruction of vegetation, growing numbers of rabbits and frequent droughts, have all increased doubt about the reality and relevance of the view that "rain follows the plough". In the 1970s, it was recognised by the Australian Senate (Senate, 1970 ) that land and water resources were suffering under imported models of the "yeoman farmer" from England (Rudd, 1899) . Despite this realisation, unsustainable agricultural and water use practices were institutionalised under other socioeconomic and political necessities such as those implied in the "populate or perish" mentality and the stories of "turning water into gold" (Powell, 1999; Sinclair, 2001 ).
Highlights of the institutional history of the water sector
The water institutional history of Australia is closely linked to the evolution of the water sector within the colonisation and settlement policy and the economic needs of the country. The history of the water sector and its institutional arrangements can be traced by highlighting its key points from the pre-settlement era to the modern era (see McKay, 2002a) . The phase from European settlement to 1970 is characterised by predominance of economic and settlement goals being achieved by large water projects. A chronological list of these events are given below.
. Prior to 1788
. Economic and spiritual connections to water were remnant in language. . Water catchment boundaries reflected tribal area boundaries (e.g. Victoria).
. 1788: Early settler exploration . Legal ruling of terra nullius was given and hence, no indigenous water issues . Hope of an inland delta of a freshwater lake.
. 1800: Colonial governments' exploitation of water . "Magic pudding" approach . "Rain follows the plough" . Water can be managed in isolation . Water is a free good . Desert will bloom with irrigation . Usurpation of indigenous water rights (Langdon, 2002 A few points deserve attention in this brief sketch of the history of the water sector and its institutional arrangements. First, earlier changes in water institutions have been motivated largely by exogenous factors such as settlement requirements of a new colony and political needs of a federal arrangement. But, since 1970, institutional changes have occurred mainly because of endogenous factors, which are intimately connected to the water sector such as water scarcity, salinity, cost-recovery issues and droughts. Second, although water institutions in Australia in the early stages have evolved around the states in the light of the constitutional provisions of the power over water resources, since the COAG reforms of 1994, they have evolved to attend national and interstate concerns. Third, similarly, water management concerns have also broadened to account for larger environmental, social and cultural goals. Fourth, by linking water reforms to the National Competition Policy, the Government of Australia has also attempted to package water reforms as part of a larger national programme for economic revitalisation and development. As a result, the roles of market and private sector have been further deepened for water resources allocation and management. Finally, the historical evolution of water institutions in Australia also provides evidence for the fact that institutions -both in general and in the water sector -develop by building on the structural and sequential linkages between institutional components (North, 1990; Saleth & Dinar, 2004) . The clear case is the linkages between the development and refinement of water rights and the emergence of higher-level institutions such as water markets.
Constitutional division of power over water
The Federation was grafted onto and over existing colonial legislatures that had evolved unique acts and unique institutions from a complex history of partisan political negotiations (Hallows & Thompson, 1999) . In 1901, the water and other fronts in the Federation of Australia were a contested issue, with the eventual political compromises resulting in the power over water remaining with the states. The powers of the new Federal Government were listed in section 51 of the Constitution and these are broad, with 39 placita covering such topics as trade and commerce. These powers of the Commonwealth are to be construed liberally (Crawford, 1991) and with the addition of the power over navigation, the Commonwealth has a strong set of powers.
7 It was because of the wide ranging powers of the Commonwealth under section 51 that a prohibition was inserted under section 100 to protect the rights of the states and their residents.
8 This section that gave the power over irrigation to the states was inserted essentially to allay the fears of the three powerful states of NSW, Victoria and South Australia (Lane, 1986) .
As the constitutional division of power left water resources largely within the jurisdiction of the states, there were some immediate problems. Each state began to develop a narrow approach by considering the water resources of its territory as its own resources (McKay, 1994) . For instance, NSW felt as though the Murray River belonged to it alone (Broughton, 1999) and it took until 1915 to draw up an agreement over the Murray between the three basin states with Queensland becoming the fourth riparian state in 1922. The legacy of power sharing in the water sector has not only been the emergence of interstate rivalries in water development and claims but also the creation of state-specific systems for water allocation, use and management. 9 But there was some uniformity as each state has adopted the public-sector model for the provision of water (and also of gas and power). Each state did not look beyond its own boundaries until a crisis in a shared resource forced the formation of agreements such as the Murray-Darling and Border Ranges agreements (McKay, 2002a) . Despite section 100, the Commonwealth has intervened in state water management sporadically, mostly as crisis responses. The 1967 drought and salinity threat in the Murray basin are some of the contexts for such interventions. 10 In 1978, under the National Water Resources Financial Assistance Act, the Commonwealth provided funding support for the states to target long-terms issues such as water conservation, desalinisation and water quality and flood mitigation. In 1992, under the provisions of the same Act, funds were also provided for the states to promote integrated management of water, land, soils and vegetation.
Water institutional reforms since 1995
In view of the strong British tradition and common law influence, the water institutions of Australia initially had features more suitable to a better water-endowed region than to the dry reality of Australia. Besides the natural evolution of institutions in line with changing resource realities, a series of deliberate reforms effected since the late 1980s has led to some metamorphic changes (Musgrave, 1997) . The riparian system of water use was replaced by the water license system, which, over time, allowed quantitative entitlements, metered supply and volumetric water pricing (McGlynn, 1997) . Although these licenses were originally attached to land, the reforms undertaken in the 1980s have enabled them to be transferable, creating the basic framework not only for cost recovery but also for the emergence of water markets. Although water charges are based mostly on metered volumes, they were lower and subsidised, as in most other countries. But they were revised upwards following the recommendation of the Industry Commission's Report of 1992.
Interregional issues are addressed through river basin organisations operating within an inter/ intra-regional allocation framework conducive for market-based solutions. In general terms, the institutional arrangements in the water sector not only delineate well the respective sphere of influence for various government layers and other stakeholders but also rely on a mix of administrative regulations and economic instruments. While water institutions in Australia are far more advanced than those in many other countries, they are not immune to the constant strains engendered by the physical limits of water resources potential (Saleth & Dinar, 1999) . As such, the water sector is not free from serious problems; also, the existing water institutions are not adequate to meet all future water allocation challenges. It is these problems and challenges that motivated the reforms of 1995 that followed the Water Reform Agreement signed by the COAG in 1994. The key components of the agreement are improving water quality and environment, refining water rights system and water allocation procedures, pricing water through independent review and promoting community participation (DLWC, Department of Land and Water Conservation, 1998) .
A notable feature of the 1995 reforms is that they are linked to the National Competition Policy built on the principle of fiscal federalism. Importantly, these reforms are also linked to fiscal incentives, as the states undertaking the reforms will receive a total of 16 billion Australian dollars from the federal taxation money. The reform agenda commits all the state governments to enact new water laws, apply pro-competition laws, create independent bodies to regulate pricing of services from state monopolies and undertake structural reform to facilitate competition and review of legal restrictions to competition. In the particular context of the water sector, the reform aims to address problems such as the unfair charging of water, inefficiency of water suppliers, poor investment decisions and inadequate institutional governance (Shadwick, 2002) . The reforms are multifaceted as they also require the promotion of community participation in the evolution and implementation of new water sharing arrangements, which need to be sustainable in the three dimensions of economics, ecology and society. From an operational perspective, the reforms try to separate water service provision into three separate activities, i.e. provision, regulation and competition to achieve full cost recovery, promote water allocation reforms and encourage water trading in the context of environmental allocations.
Since the operationalisation of these reform components entails attracting federal money, most states have already come out with time-bound action plans for initiating additional water sector reforms. NSW was the first to establish the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal to review the water pricing process. This state was also the first to produce a comprehensive reform package as well as a framework for its implementation. As part of its reform initiatives, NSW has adopted a three-level stress-based classification of its rivers and aquifers as the framework for controlling water pollution and overexploitation of water. The state has also constituted the Healthy River Commission with the task of monitoring and maintaining water quality and in-stream flows in all stressed rivers. Community-based Water Advisory Councils have been established at the state, as well as at the level of all stressed river and aquifer areas, with the express purpose of involving users in the water sector reform process (see DLWC, 1997a and b) . Other states have also followed with both reform programs and concrete action within the overall framework of the COAG water reform agreement.
There have also been notable reform initiatives to ensure the economic and environmental performance of the water sector. Such initiatives can be seen in the interstate basins and the irrigation and urban sub-sectors. Instances for basin-level initiatives include the reforms underlying the Cap programme being implemented in the Murray-Darling basin that aims to limit current and future water extraction to that observed in 1993-94 in an effort to control increasing salinity in the basin.
11 Instances for sub-sectoral reform initiatives include corporatisation, i.e. the conversion of public-water utilities into commercially viable autonomous entities; privatisation is also increasing in the urban (e.g. Hunter Water in 1991 and Sydney Water in 1994) as well as in the irrigation (e.g. Murray Irrigation Area and Coleambally and Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area in 1997) sectors (see DLWC, 1997a) . The ongoing institutional changes in Australia are essentially tuned to enhance the role of economic instruments, market-based water allocation and community participation while, at the same time, improving the physical health and sustainability of the water sector.
Implementation issues: few case studies
It is true that a massive programme of water sector reforms was pushed onto the states by the Federal Government under its policies of fiscal federalism and competition promotion. Indeed, significant institutional changes have occurred in most Australian states as a consequence of the 1995 reform programme. But, gaps and grey spots are still exist, as some aspects of these reforms have not yet been fully achieved and, in some arenas, the reforms did not go far enough (Water and the Australian Economy, 2000) . The main implementation failures have been concerned with the task of introducing the new ideas to the management of the water utilities and the main omissions have been in not enabling the institutional governance structures of the state to look beyond the strict confines of its boundary. There are also some implementation problems owing to confusion 11 It is certainly a difficult challenge to reverse water use to a reduced level observed in the past. But the existing system of entitlement-based volumetric water allocation across regions, sectors and individuals as well as a high level of political commitment, prompted mainly by an imminent threat to everyone within the basin, enhance the prospects of achieving the agreed cap (Saleth & Dinar, 1999). in the interpretation of the principles of sustainable development as applicable to water management. 12 Besides, some states have imposed extra obligations with respect to indigenous issues, equity aspects of reallocation and compensation for loss of rights.
Overall, the reform fatigue is acute and implementation is very patchy (Jones et al., 2001; McKay, 2003) . This is especially so in the crucial areas of property rights. As a result, the federal government has recently outlined the need to determine better and sounder ways to allocate and enforce property rights.
13 This is, of course, understandable, as Australia is still in the transition phase in the adoption and implementation of water sector reforms (Australian Financial Review, 2003) . Besides, regional variations in the nature and intensity of reforms are also natural, as each state has implemented them in their water industry in different ways and on different time scales (McKay, 2002a (McKay, , 2003 . However, there are some common problems that limit the reform progress in all states. They are the inadequacy of benchmark data, diversity of legislative bases with varying levels of attachment to old schemes, mismatch between employees' skill and transition needs, general reform fatigue and limited attention to water recycling (McKay & Hurlimann, 2003) . The issues and problems inherent in the overall process of reform implementation can be illustrated by considering a few cases of reforms.
Governance issues in new water corporations
The governance issues in the 292 newly corporatised water authorities 14 can be illustrated by the nature and appointment of their directors as well as the role and stake of the shareholders. The focus on these aspects is very pertinent because they can be indicative of the nature and tone of the overall reform process. To begin with, these water authorities are incorporated under various state acts, all of which are essentially variations of the Government Owned Corporations Act of Queensland. There are six types of institutional arrangement: statutory authorities, local governments, government-owned corporations, private entities, revised co-operatives and companies under the Corporations Law. In most authorities, the state government is the only shareholder and appoints directors -who generally must not be public servants -to manage all the affairs of the authority. But some authorities are private enterprises and have elected directors. In view of the wide diversity of the organisational and managerial structures of the newly created water utilities both within and across states, the qualification, selection process and the conditions of appointment of the directors of these utilities and enterprises are neither uniform nor entirely transparent. The same is also true of the role of shareholders in management. Some of these differences are highlighted below by considering select cases of water utilities/enterprises (McKay & Halanaik, 2003) . Sydney Water in NSW is managed by a Chairperson and nine directors, who are selected through the public advertisement process and appointed by voting shareholders including the government (NSW Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer). Directors must have expertise in business management, environmental protection and public health. Although they are appointed for five years, they can be removed at any time with or without reason or notice. In the case of Melbourne Water in Victoria, the chair deputy chair and six directors are appointed by the minister concerned on terms as specified in an instrument and by ensuring that they have the qualifications relevant to the operations of the corporation. The directors can be appointed and reappointed but only for up to nine years. The directors may be removed at any time and the conditions of appointment can be changed as well. In the case of South Australian Water, the directors with the abilities and experience required for effective discharge of business and management obligations are appointed by the minister concerned for a maximum term of three years. They may be removed on grounds that the minister thinks sufficient.
In the irrigation sector, the Murray Irrigation Ltd. in NSW is an unlisted public company with ownership of assets transferred to irrigators. Thus, irrigators are shareholders in the company holding shares in proportion to their water entitlements. The company is managed by ten directors, eight of whom are elected by irrigators from different geographical regions of the operating area and two of whom are selected for their skills in engineering and finance. But in the case of Goulburn Murray, Victoria, the company is managed by eight directors selected on basis of their skills. The Murrumbidgee Irrigation Ltd. in NSW is managed by eight directors elected by 3,000 shareholders. Directors are appointed for no longer than five years and must be able to contribute to the commercial performance of the corporation.
The experience of the water enterprises created in both the urban and irrigation sectors suggest that the directors are confused by the multiple and often conflicting requirements imposed on them (McKay, 2002c) . Moreover, the lack of transparency in their removal clauses and the influence of the government in some cases raise doubts about their ability to operate their companies entirely on objective and commercial principles. Also, the processes are not inclusive of the community (Sorenson, 2001 ). An alternative governance arrangement applicable to the newly created water enterprises in both urban and irrigation sectors is presented in Fig. 1 . The model presented in Fig. 1 is based on the European practices adjusted to suit Australian conditions. It has three major innovations: specification of the skill base of board members with transparent board election processes, limiting the size to nine with a neutral party and the capping of dividend payments to reflect only a reasonable return on capital. It is imperative to promote interstate uniformity and consistency in water laws and water allocation policies.
Public preference and reform direction
The literature on institutional economics in both general and water sector contexts (e.g. North, 1990; Saleth & Dinar, 2004) underlines the influence that convergence in stakeholder perception or preference plays in determining the direction of institutional reforms. While the overall reform experience in Australia conforms to such a role, there are also instances of specific reform components where there is a divergence between stakeholder preference and the reform focus. One instance is the nature of water quality guidance adopted in the state of Victoria. The water supply system in Victoria is one of the most well developed, thanks to the 1995 reforms. There are as many as 24 water suppliers in the state including the three metropolitan suppliers in Melbourne who compete with each other to provide better water services. The three metropolitan suppliers have, in fact, replaced the one monolithic public-sector body that catered for water needs before 1995. Despite such favorable developments, there has not been any uniform water quality standard until recently. The survey of key actors in the three metropolitan and two rural water supply systems as well as in the three government departments carried out by Moeller (2001) reveals that these water supply bodies use different guidelines on drinking water quality. Interestingly, while the respondents preferred mandatory guidelines, those adopted during the reform process were actually voluntary guidelines. The issue here is not only the divergence between preference and practice but also the diversity in water quality standards, which can dilute quality enforcement.
Water privatisation and public interest
In an effort to separate service-provision activities from regulatory responsibilities, Australia has not only gone for the corporatisation and debureaucratisation of water utilities but also promoted private sector participation in specific segments of water supply such as water purification. This experiment, which started even before the 1995 reforms, was highly beneficial as it has supplemented public investment with private sector investment and expertise. But there have also been cases where there were conflicts between private interests and public welfare. One of these cases relates to the water quality crisis in Sydney in 1998. The crisis was prompted by the observation of high levels of two microscopic protozoans, i.e. Cryptosporidium and Giardia, which were found in the water at several locations in Sydney and in its key filtration plant at Prospect. This plant, which filters 85% of the city water supply, has been operated by a private consortium, i.e. Australian Water Services, since the early 1990s.
15 This has sparked three separate "boil-water" alerts by the water supply and health authorities. Although few residents, if any, fell ill from drinking the water, the issue became a serious subject in media with considerable political implications. Soon, the Government of NSW commissioned a probe to look into the root cause of the crisis.
The government-commissioned probe (McClellan, 1999) showed that the operational practices of the private company had risked the safety of the water supply. However, the private company maintained that it had always met the stringent water standards specified in its contract and argued that there had been no evidence for the failure of its filtration plant at Prospect. However, the McClellan's inquiry produced 850 pages of reports on quality crisis and found that at the time of the first contamination, the private company applied the lowest possible chemical doses to remove the contaminants from water, used filter runs of up to 70 hours to conserve energy and reused filtercleansing water. But the inquiry was unable to put the blame on Australian Water Services (McClellan, 1999) . Meanwhile, the Australian Water Services tried to pass the blame on to Sydney Water, which supplies raw water to the plant and manages the catchments and distribution networks. This caused a strain in the relationship between the private company and Sydney Water when the latter, at one point, threatened to shut down or take over the Prospect plant. The events prompted the creation of another body to manage the catchment and supply of raw water. Thus, the water quality crisis and its organisational and political fallouts have led to further separation of managerial functions.
Water rights and compensation
Separation of water rights from land rights and the promotion of trading in water rights have been major planks of the water sector reforms initiated since 1995. But interstate differences in the legal system and regional variations in water quality guidelines are inhibiting water exchanges (McKay, 2001 (McKay, , 2002b (McKay, , 2003 Australian Financial Review, 2003) . As there has been a general misinterpretation of legal terms, the use of the term "property rights" in the COAG document has fostered an acrimonious debate among the states. The lack of consistency in the definition of property rights has obviously rendered water trading across states to be difficult and rare. Although the old water rights were never more than a licence, many farmers believed that they had a right to the water and, hence, also the right to compensation (Nature Conservation Council of NSW, 2002). In South Australia, water rights, in some cases, were periodically revoked on the grounds of environmental stress during the 1970s. But this has never happened in other states and there is a strong belief that water rights could not be taken away. Indeed, many water rights holders, who have never used their water allocations in the past, are now beginning to sell their rights. The selling of water rights by these "sleeper" water rights holders has increased the volume of water used, causing negative environmental impacts in some places (McKay, 2002a) . 15 Australian Water Services is a consortium of the French water and energy utility, Suez, and the Australian real estate and finance company, Lend Lease Corporation. This consortium won the 25-year build-own-operate contract for the filtering plant in 1992 and the plant became operational in 1996. Interestingly, this consortium won the contract despite the doubts expressed by the officials about its ability to operate the plant because it proposed to use a single sand filter instead of the dual filters proposed by other competing consortia.
Some lobby groups such as the Cotton Farmers in NSW and Queensland have been successful in getting the federal government to recommend compensation when the water rights were eroded (Farmonline, 2002) . The water rights were eroded because of the development of Water Allocation Management Plans prepared as part of the Cap programme. In this case, there is a clear conflict between the interest of the water rights holders and the interest of the society at large. The resolution depends clearly on compensation as argued by lobby groups such as the National Farmers Federation and the Australian Bankers Association but the key issue is who pays for the compensation (Australian Financial Review, 2003) . Of all the new water laws in Australia, only those in NSW and Queensland have mentioned compensation and these too only in a limited way. The nature and quantum of compensation specified in the law also differ between these two states. In Queensland, Section 986 of the law provides for reasonable compensation for changes in water allocations within the 10-year duration set for the Water Management Plan. Compensation is paid based on the basis of the market value of the water. 16 In NSW, Section 79 of the law provides for the minister to have the power to acquire licences in special circumstances and for public interest purposes. But, as in Queensland, the compensation is based on the market value of the licence and will be paid for all changes during the 10-year period of the Water Management Plan. Compensation is not paid for variations in the plan, but for other variations and the minister decides the amount by considering the market value of the foregone allocations.
Issues in water pricing
An ideal water-pricing regime would account for infrastructure costs and the variable costs and would also include a component to capture the opportunity costs, environmental costs and society costs. The COAG reform requires all states to implement a two-part tariff with a fixed charge reflecting the cost of service provision and a variable charge based on consumption volume. Each state has implemented this policy in different ways and imposed different costs. An examination of the pricing procedures followed in three states reveals that none of them give any intrinsic value to raw water. There are also no acceptable methods to cost environmental externalities. Often, 0.05-1.5 Australian cents are imposed per kilolitre of water as an additional charge to account for the cost of administering various catchment management boards.
There are also other differences in the method being used for valuing infrastructure costs both within and across states. While the COAG has endorsed the optimised deprival method (Queensland Competition Authority, 2000) , some water authorities used a depreciated optimised replacement cost. As a result, charges for irrigation water in NSW are significantly lower than those imposed in Victoria and Queensland, while those in South Australia are lower than those in NSW but higher than those in Victoria and Queensland (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) of NSW, 1996) . Moreover, the arrangements for regulating the water pricing policy also vary across the states. While pricing regulation is governed by the IPART in NSW and the Australian Capital Territory, the Queensland Competition Authority performs that role in Queensland. Tasmania relies on the Pricing and Oversight Commission whereas South Australia uses the Essential Services Commission and Western Australia is planning the creation of a new body for this purpose.
Issues in dividend payments
The water reform process in Australia has proceeded on the path of corporatisation. This clearly brings the issue of dividend payment to shareholders. Since the metropolitan water utilities are essentially owned by the government, they pay dividends to the government. The governments can take the dividends and invest them in areas it considers fit, not necessarily in water infrastructure. But this is unlike the procedure in Australian company law where if a dividend is not paid, then the funds are used to restore company assets, i.e. used by the directors for the benefit of the company. Although the dividend must only be paid out of profits, in most cases, the minister has the power to direct a specific amount out of such proceeds. In this condition, the proposal by the board to invest in, say, environmental improvement could be defeated if the government insists on dividends. This process can lead to the derailing of investment decisions by the Board and, hence, to little scope for achieving the goals set in COAG reforms. However, the issue of dividend payment in the case of privatised and corporatised irrigation companies is different, as the shareholders there are users and their involvement in the managerial process can allow appropriate decisions on the use of their dividends.
Reflections on the reform process
This review of water institutional reforms and the discussion of a few case studies enables provision of a context to reflect the Australian reform experience within the theoretical and empirical framework proposed in a recent study on water institutional reforms by Saleth & Dinar (2004) . This study proposed an institutional transaction cost framework that tries to explain the initiation and implementation of institutional reforms in term of the transaction and opportunity cost (social loss of inaction) implications of various socio-economic, political and resource-related factors. In terms of this framework, the main factors motivating the recent reforms in Australia are both endogenous to the water sector, such as water scarcity, salinity and the financial burden of subsidies in water provision and exogenous to the water sector, such as the macro economic changes and the political economy necessities of a federal system of government. Besides, natural events such as droughts, as well as accidental events such as the Sydney water quality crisis, have also contributed to a political context and pressures for reforms. Moreover, the COAG agreement and massive federal assistance have also played a key role in reducing the transaction costs of reforms in the reckoning of the states while the economic and environmental costs of the brewing water crisis played the same role at the local levels of users.
The process of water institutional reforms observed in Australia also offers some evidence as well of qualifications for the stage-based perspective of institutional change proposed by Saleth & Dinar (2004) . Certainly, the reform process was very much influenced by both subjective and objective feedback and adaptation. Objective factors such as resource scarcity, environmental degradations and financial losses are as important as the subjective factors like public perception and ideological conflicts between the promotion of market reforms and the preservation of state powers. The reforms initiated after the public outcry over the Sydney crisis is an interesting practical illustration of the stage-based theory of institutional change. In this case, the roles of convergence in public perception, its political articulation, media role and government-sponsored probe can also be seen very clearly in the eventual organisational change that separates the catchment management functions from the water provision functions. This case also shows that the subjective perception of objective reality is more powerful than the reality itself as the quality problem was not as lethal as it was projected or believed to be. However, there are also cases, such as the water quality guidance, where the water suppliers have relied on voluntary compliance whereas the majority of the stakeholders prefer mandatory compliance. The divergence here can be explained by the differential transaction cost calculus of the two parties, as the suppliers consider it to be too costly to enforce and monitor quality whereas the stakeholders consider the social costs of poor quality are much higher than the enforcement costs.
There are also a few anecdotal instances in the way that reform design and implementation principles are used to advance water sector reform in Australia. Most of the recent institutional changes were possible in the water sector as Australia already had some basic institutional requirements such as the water permit system, volumetric allocation, basin organisations and legal mechanisms for conflict resolution. In this sense, the costs of transacting the recent institutional changes such as the refinement of water rights, water markets, privatisation and pricing reforms were far lower than when the initial institutional conditions are absent or inadequate. Clearly, the transaction cost implications of institutional linkages are well exploited during the reform process. However, as pointed out by North (1990) , institutional linkages can also constrain reforms in view of the role of path-dependent properties of institutions. Such constraints are, in fact, evident as most Australian states have tried to effect reforms based on earlier legal and organisational foundations. This is illustrated by the way the governance arrangements are structured in the newly created water companies to retain government influence. This is also true, to some extent, in the determination of compensation for loss of water allocation. The Australian experience also demonstrates the effectiveness of the packaging approach and reform timing as water reforms were linked with financial incentives and coincided with the general economic reforms under the National Competition Policy.
Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the water institutional reforms in Australia focusing especially on the nature and extent of reforms initiated since 1995 and as provided case studies to highlight the issues and challenges encountered in effecting changes in some key reform components. The COAG reforms of 1995 were the most recent in a series of federal interventions in water management that have relied on fiscal incentives and economic persuasions.
17 These reforms are notable for their comprehensiveness and clear targets with incentives for their time-bound achievement by the states. Despite the problems and limitations of the reform process, water institutions in Australia have undergone remarkable changes, especially from the perspectives of the long-term path of institutional evolution. Certainly, there are still issues and challenges to be expected when reforming maturing water institutions. Issues such as the diversity of interstate legal systems and interregional water quality standards, the conflicts between private interest and public welfare and the preservation of the autonomy of the newly created water companies are still serious in constraining market-based water allocation and management. Clearly, Australia is still in need of further reforms, especially to promote national standards in many legal, policy and organisational spheres of water allocation and management. Despite this, the Australian reform experience provides considerable insight into understanding both the theory and practice of water institutional reforms.
